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ABSTRACT
With regard to the connectedness of the political subject and 
its community, Rawls's theory of justice has often been 
criticised by the thinkers whose thoughts are oriented 
towards community. Rawls was considered to have 
impoverished the political subject by treating it as floating 
individual, rooted out of its foundation in community. In 
the middle of the debate that was still going on around this 
matter, an edited version of the young Rawls's thesis was 
published. Despite the fact that this did not help much in 
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saving this philosopher from the criticism by the 
communitarian thinkers because of his final preference that 
leaned towards political conception, the ethical theological 
work at least showed that communitarian position was once 
chosen by Rawls. By reading and comparing and 
juxtaposing this work with his later works, we can see that 
Rawls, the proposer of justice as fairness, did not completely 
drop his younger thought on person and community. In 
other words, between the theological ethics of the Young 
Rawls and the justice theory of Rawls there is a continuity of 
thought. This can be sensed among other in his basic 
assumptions on the individual and the society, those he 
implies in his argument on the 'difference principle' and the 
'principle of equal opportunity'.
person personality individual community society difference 
principle principle of equal opportunity fairness equality 
equality in community civic friendship interpersonal 
relationship comprehensive doctrine
Preliminary Remarks
he discovery of Rawls's undergraduate thesis at Princeton library in 
T2006 is of great significance for the study of Rawls's political 
philosophy. Published in 2010 by Harvard University Press under the title 
of A Brief Inquiry Into The Meaning Of Sin & Faith, the senior thesis sparks a 
fresh interest in the hidden role that religion and religious (Christian) ideas 
have played in the political thinking of this titan of twentieth century 
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political philosophy.  Given the fact that Rawls himself acknowledged 
having abandoned his orthodox Christian belief since June 1945 on the one 
hand, but still mentioned religion here and there in his later works on the 
other, a host of questions may leap to mind. Has the theologically laden 
view of the young Rawls influenced the thought of the later Rawls? If yes, in 
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what way and to what extent has the influence taken place? What are the 
points of rupture and of contact between the senior thesis of Rawls and his 
conception of justice in his later works?
These questions have been addressed and treated at considerable length 
by some scholars, be they Rawlsian or not. Fourteen years before the 
publication of the BISF, Ricoeur already made an attempt to interpret 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice from a quasi-theological point of view. In his 
provocative reading of this work, Ricoeur suggests that Rawls's principles of 
justice are but a formalization of the commandment to love for the purpose 
of social practice, and that it is its secret kinship with the commandment to 
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love that saves Rawls's difference principle from sliding into utilitarianism.  
Eric Gregory in his reading of Rawls's undergraduate thesis comes up with a 
similar suggestion. Reading the thesis in tandem with the later works of the 
philosopher leads him to a conclusion that the relation between the young 
Rawls and the later Rawls is remarkable. He maintains, for example, that 
Rawls's later works can be seen as an attempt to provide a scheme through 
which humans themselves have to work to mitigate the effects of bad 
fortune, due to the impossibility of appealing to the divinity for the 
3
suffering and evil that human beings experience.  
Equally important as these two studies is the study by Nagel and 
4
Cohen.  In the introduction to the BISF, Cohen and Nagel– themselves 
Rawls's students at Harvard – point out the religious temper of the life and 
writings of the later Rawls, which they say can be seen in Rawls's conviction 
that the aim of political philosophy is to defend reasonable faith by seeking 
5
the possibility of a just constitutional democracy.  Rawls, as Cohen and 
Nagel maintain, also uses theological vocabulary in his remark that the 
original position enables us to see social world from the point of view of 
6
eternity.  What is nevertheless much more important for the purpose of this 
essay is Cohen and Nagel's finding about the points of contact between the 
theological outlook of Rawls's BISF and the moral outlook of his TJ. The 
main points of contact as they identify them are as follows: 1) Rawls's 
definition of morality in terms of personal relations rather than of the 
pursuit of the highest good, 2) his emphasis on the separateness of persons, 
so that moral community is a relation among distinct individuals, 3) his 
rejection of the concept of society as a contract among egoistic individuals, 
4) his denunciation of inequality based on exclusion and hierarchy, and 5) 
7
his rejection of the idea of merit.  
Also of crucial importance for the issue in question is Robert Merrihew 
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Adams's “The Theological Ethics of the Young Rawls and Its Background”  
–which is also included in the BISF. In this comprehensive explication of 
Rawls's senior thesis, Adams identifies the different places in which the 
trace of theological ethics of the young Rawls is found in the works of the 
later Rawls. Among obvious resemblances between the two are the notions 
of persons as free and equal individuals, the emphasis on values of equality, 
9
and the rejection of merit.
Adding to the above studies, this essay attempts to examine the 
relationship between the theological ethics of the young Rawls and the 
second principle of justice of the later Rawls, which comprises the principle 
10
of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle.  Focusing on 
this set of principles because of their unique combination of equality and 
option for the least advantaged, I will argue that they are but a formulation 
of some of the basic values Rawls holds in the BISF but are expressed in 
terms of the so-called 'political conception'. I will try to show that the 
continuation of the young Rawls's theological ethics to the later Rawls's 
second principle of justice runs through his conception of community and 
personhood. To do so, I will begin with outlining the young Rawls's 
conception of community and personhood as the core concepts of his 
theological ethics (Section  1), then present some tenets of the second 
principle of justice (Section 2), and finally explore the connection between 
the young Rawls's conception of person and community and the second 
principle of justice (Section 3).
The Young Rawls's Conception of Person and of Community
Personality and community are among the core concepts of the young 
Rawls's theological ethics as expressed in the BISF. His elucidation of sin 
and faith and his charge against so-called 'naturalism' – both of which he 
says are the main aims of his senior thesis – can be said to revolve around 
11
these two core concepts.  In what follows I will give a brief account of the 
young Rawls's conception of personhood and community and some issues 
clustered around this conception in order to make this paper intelligible.
The Young Rawls on Person
Rawls treats the existence of personality in the world as a basic belief 
from which his inquiry into the meaning of sin and faith evolves. He 




make his notion of personality clearer by drawing a subtle distinction 
between individuals and persons by saying that “[b]y personality we do not 
mean individuals” and that “personality is something over and above 
12
individuals as such,” but without explaining further why it is so.  Another 
attempt he makes is to equate personality with 'spirit' and spiritual life with 
personal life. Yet at the end it seems that this attempt does not help much 
13
either because 'spirit' too, as he admits, is a term that can be hardly defined.  
However, we can infer the main characteristic of personality from Rawls's 
assertion that “[a]ll persons are individuals, that is, separate and distinct 
14
units, but all individuals are not persons.”  By saying that individuals are 
separate and distinct units and by contrasting persons with individuals, 
Rawls seems to suggest that what distinguishes person from individual is its 
15
being in the community, its relation to others.  This is supported by his 
statement that “[m]an, as person, belongs to this community and it is 
membership in the community which is the distinctive thing about man 
16
[.]”
This distinction between persons and individuals discloses what Rawls 
believes to be the distinctive feature of human beings. Departing from the 
long held view of human nature as rational being, Rawls maintains that the 
very nature of human beings as persons is their being in relation to 
community. Human beings are communal by nature, he says. Rawls takes 
this to be his fundamental assumption, so that he feels a need to present this 
basic belief strongly; and so he writes: 
[w]hat is man? We believe that man is a communal being and thereby 
possess personality. The distinctive thing about man is not his reason, not 
his appreciation of beauty, not his various powers; no, man's 
distinctiveness from other worldly creatures is that he was made for 
community and that he is a personality necessarily related to 
17
community.  
This turning away from the classical Greek view of human nature along 
with his rejection of natural (Platonic and Aristotelian) ethics seems to stem 
from the same concern, i.e. to safeguard persons from being treated as 
objects and merely separate units.
Another characteristic of personality in the young Rawls's view is 
irreducibility and uniqueness. He says that personality is not reducible to 
18
“the possession of a particular body or to the sum of mental states.”  Yet as 
in the case of other features of personality, Rawls takes this to be a basic 
5
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belief that people with common sense can easily accept. It will nevertheless 
make more sense if we connect this belief with his equation of personality 
with spirit. Reading the statement in this context, I take Rawls to be 
suggesting that it is the spirit that makes human beings unique and 
irreducible.
The Young Rawls on Community
Now let us turn to Rawls conception of community. As we have seen, 
personality is for Rawls communal; human beings as persons are beings in 
and for community. But what is community for him? The community that 
the young Rawls has in mind and refers to in the BISF is the community of 
faith, a religious community.  Although admitting that it is difficult to 
define the term 'community', he is sure that community is not an aggregate 
19
of individuals; rather, it is that which involves personality.  Put more 
clearly, it is the realm in which the whole array of relations among persons 
based on faith and love takes place. This community should not be 
understood in a narrow sense as referring to the so-called congregation of 
the faithful, no matter how strong the inclination to do so may be. This 
equation should not be made since Rawls conceives community so as to 
include the whole universe as far as its spiritual aspect is concerned. “The 
world in its essence, is a community, a community of creator and created, 
20
and has its source, God,” he writes.  The establishment of such a 
community, he believes, is the final end of God's creation. 
Already at the outset, Rawls makes clear what he believes to be the 
relationship between personality and community: that the two are so 
mutually interdependent that “[u]nless we have personality, we do not have 
21
community [and] unless we have community we do not have personality.”  
It is in the framework of personality and community that Rawls discusses 
22
natural relation and personal relation.  He defines natural relation as a 
relation taking place between a person and some object, of which the 
relation between someone as a person with things desired is an example. 
This type of relation is considered normal, not bearing any moral weight, as 
far as it is practised in the natural realm. It is a relation proper to such a 
realm. By personal relation the young Rawls means a relation between two 
persons. Buberian in tone, he describes it as a relation between the 'I' and 
'Thou', in which both persons involved in the relation are seen as equal and 
treating each other as such. “It is the sharing of fellowship, of communion, 
23
of mutual presence; or it is giving, loving, and sharing[.]”  This is the ideal 
6
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type of relation the young Rawls has in mind when he talks about 
community, although he is also aware of the fact that hate and envy too can 
take place in personal relations. 
The Young Rawls on Sin and Faith
What do personality, community, and relations have to do with sin and 
faith? Rawls in fact explains the meaning of sin and faith in terms of 
relations among persons in the community. He expresses the meaning of 
faith in several different ways. In his view, faith is “the inner state of a 
person who is properly integrated and related to community,” or “a relation 
of one person to another and to community,” or “the construction or the 
24
building of community”.  This understanding of the meaning of faith is 
rather different from the conventional one, in which faith is conceived as 
somewhat of a belief. This is exactly the case for the young Rawls, since he 
contends that belief is a cognitive attitude towards certain propositions, 
such as Christian dogma. Faith, in his view, is deeper than belief in that in 
faith one moves from a mere cognitive attitude towards dogma about God 
to being in a relation with God. Faith nevertheless should not be confined 
to relation with God only; it also has to do with relation with other persons.
While faith is for Rawls being in community with God and fellow 
human beings as persons, sin is for him destruction, annihilation, and 
25
repudiation of community.  It results from extending the natural cosmos, 
i.e. enlarging the use of natural relation to the realm of personal relation. 
Put in other words, sin is treating other persons, be they fellow human 
beings or God, as objects; and in so doing treating them impersonally. Sin, 
26
as Rawls puts it, manifests itself in two forms, i.e. egoism and egotism.  An 
egoist uses other persons as objects and treats them as means for satisfying 
his or her own desire; whereas an egotist refuses to share anything in order 
27
to preserve his/her distinctiveness from other people.  When one sins, s/he 
is cut off from community. The restoration of the relation leading to the re-
integration into community is called conversion, which, in Rawls's view, is 
28
God's election and gift since man cannot save himself.  
Indeed, Rawls's elucidation of community and personality in the BISF 
is much richer than what is presented here. We in fact have not yet touched 
other important – though minor – themes of the young Rawls's theological 
ethics, such as social contract, utilitarianism, and merit. Yet for the time 
being, suffice it to limit the presentation to what we have now for the 
purpose of this essay. As for the untouched themes, I will incorporate them 
7
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as I discuss the relationship between the young Rawls's conception of 
personhood and community and the later Rawls's second principle of 
justice later on.
Rawls's Second Principle of Justice: Some Tenets 
In this section I will present succinctly some tenets of Rawls's second 
principle of justice. This I do as a preparation for exploring the connections 
between this principle and the young Rawls's theological ethics in Section 3 
of this paper. It should be noted that Rawls treats his two principles of 
justice as a set and sees them as so intimately related to one another that one 
cannot understand the second principle of justice without paying attention 
to the first one (the principle of equal liberties). Due to the purpose of this 
paper and the limits of time and space, I will nevertheless limit myself to 
presenting the second principle of justice and will touch the first principle 
of justice only insofar as it can help bringing the tenets of the former under 
a brighter light. 
General Features
Rawls's second principle of justice, in its most recent version, reads as 
follows: 
[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they 
are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of 
fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference 
29
principle).  
It consists of two subsets of principles lexically ordered, i.e. the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle. 
Three things are worth bearing in mind as far as the second principle of 
30
justice is concerned.  First, the principle is set in a purely hypothetical 
situation of social contract. In this imagined situation, the parties involved 
in the contract choose a conception of justice that would govern their social 
cooperation without knowing their places in society, their social classes and 
31
positions, abilities, intelligences, strength, etc.  This is what Rawls means 
when he says that the principles of justice are to be chosen behind the 'veil 
of ignorance'.  The aim of this mode of choosing is to guarantee that the 
initial (original) situation is fair, so that the fundamental agreements 
8
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achieved in such situation are also fair.   
Secondly, this principle is to be applied to the basic structure of society. 
In other words, the basic structure of society is the primary subject of this 
principle of justice. By 'basic structure' Rawls means “the way in which 
major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and 
determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” in the form 
of a public system of rules; while 'major social institutions' refers to “the 
political constitution and the principal economic and social 
33
arrangements.”  Targeting the basic structure of society, the principle, 
Rawls asserts, is not to be applied to single transaction viewed in isolation 
34
from the system.  
Thirdly, as in the case of the two principles of justice taken as a set, in the 
second principle of justice too there applies the priority or primacy rule. In 
the second principle of justice, says Rawls, the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity is prior to the difference principle and has an absolute weight 
35
over it.  This priority requires that in order for the difference principle to 
be applied, the principle of fair equality of opportunity must be satisfied 
first. Bearing these four features of the second principle of justice in mind, 
let us let us consider its two subsets one by one, following the sequence 
Rawls sets forth in his explication of them.
The Difference Principle
We begin with the difference principle. This principle makes its 
demand on society's basic structure as follows: social and economic 
inequalities are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members 
36
of society.  To understand this principle, it should be borne in mind that 
Rawls's justice as fairness idealizes social goods and resources produced by 
37
social cooperation being distributed justly, i.e. equally;  and thus 
inequalities are undesired. Why are they undesired? Rawls gives several 
reasons. First, because it seems wrong that some people in society are amply 
provided for, while a few find their urgent needs go unfulfilled. Second, 
because socioeconomic inequalities can lead to one part of society 
controlling and dominating the rest in the political domain. Thirdly, 
because political and economic inequalities are so closely related to social 
status that they can cause those of lower status to view themselves and 
38
viewed by other as inferiors.   
The problem is that even in a well-ordered society, in which both equal 
basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity are secured, certain forms of 
32
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inequalities exist due to the differences in the shares of primary social goods 
among members of society. Those primary goods are (1) basic rights and 
liberties, (2) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation, (3) 
powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority, (4) income 
39
and wealth, and (5) social bases of self-respect.  Among the inequalities 
there exist the so-called socioeconomic inequalities. Such inequalities are 
caused by the difference in the distribution of income and wealth, the cause 
of which can be traced further to the differences in three kinds of 
contingencies, i.e. (1) social class of origin, (2) native endowments, and (3) 
40
luck.  The difference in the distribution of income and wealth leads to what 
in Rawls's view are the most serious inequalities from the point of view of 
political justice: inequalities in citizens' prospects over a complete life or, 
41
simply expressed, life-prospects.  It is these socioeconomic inequalities that 
the second principle of justice is meant to regulate.
The question is then: if inequalities are to exist, how are they to be 
justified? Alternatively, what makes inequalities permissible? The answer – 
and at the same time criterion – the difference principle provides is: insofar 
as they are to the greatest benefit of the worst off in society. By saying this, 
Rawls does not mean that other members (or, more precisely put: index 
positions) of society are excluded from the benefits. Rawls makes this point 
clear by first setting out a general conception of justice which requires that 
“[a]ll social values – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the 
social bases of self-respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
42
distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage.”  The 
two principles of justice, under which the difference principle is a subset, are 
considered to be a special conception of justice.  Presupposing the general 
43
conception of justice, they specify it and are subject to its constraints.  In 
the difference principle, Rawls makes a shift from the general conception of 
justice to the special one by admitting the principle of efficiency but then 
44
trying to go beyond it.  He goes beyond the precept of this principle by 
singling out the least advantaged as a particular position from which the 
social and economic inequalities of the basic structure are to be judged. 
Rawls calls this the democratic interpretation of equality. The result is a 
precept stating that “the higher expectations of the better situated are just if 
and only if they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations 
45
of the least advantaged members of society.”  So, the difference principle 
requires, firstly, that the existing inequalities are to be for the benefit of all 
members of society; they are to improve everyone's situation. Only from 
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within this constraint is a scheme worked out for the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged. 
As the difference principle requires, socioeconomic inequalities are 
allowed insofar as they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged members of society. But who are the least advantaged? Rawls 
singles out this group by reference to the holding of (index of) primary 
46
goods, the list of which we have mentioned before.   In a well ordered 
society, says Rawls, the least advantaged are those who belong to the income 
class with the lowest expectations. Defined simply in the frame of the 
difference principle, the least advantaged are “those who share with other 
citizens the basic equal liberties and fair opportunities but have the least 
47
income and wealth.”  To be more specific, belong to this group are persons 
whose family and class origins are more disadvantaged than others, whose 
natural endowments (as realized) permit them to fare less well, and whose 
fortune and luck in the course of life turn out to be less happy, all within 
the normal range […] and with relevant measures based on social primary 
48
goods.  
Rawls acknowledges that a certain arbitrariness in identifying the least 
advantaged group is unavoidable because it is difficult to determine what 
'normal range' and 'relevant measure' mean. To solve this problem, he 
49
proposes two suggestions.  First, to choose a particular social position (for 
example, unskilled workers or farmers) and then count those in this 
position with less income and wealth as the least advantaged. Secondly, to 
single out the least advantaged not with reference to particular social 
position, but by regarding all persons with income less than a half of the 
median as the least advantaged. 
Given the demand of the difference principle, how should the basic 
structure of society be arranged so that such requirement is to be satisfied? 
What scheme of cooperation should be taken up? According to Rawls, we 
should choose the most effective scheme, i.e. one that produces the greatest 
benefit (or index goods) for the worst off while advancing the index goods 
50
of the more advantaged.  To illustrate this, let us consider the following 
simple example. Suppose that there are three schemes of social cooperation, 
each producing different salary for the more advantaged group (MAG) and 
wage for the least advantaged group (LAG) for the whole course of life. 
Scheme 1 produces 4 for MAG and 2 for LAG, scheme 2 produces 7 for 
MAG and 4 for LAG, and scheme 3 produces 5 for MAG and 6 for LAG. In 
11
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this case, the difference principle requires that scheme 3 be taken up because 
it is the most effective one in the sense described above. In order that the 
ideal of the difference principle can be realized, Rawls sees it as important 
that public rules organize productive activity, specify the division of labor, 
assign various roles to those engaged in it, and – most importantly – 
51
schedule wages and salaries accordingly.  
By way of closing, it should be noted that however appealing the 
difference principle may be, it must not be treated as absolute. It must rather 
be seen in connection with the principle of fair equality of opportunity. 
Albeit the principle of equality of opportunity is explicated after the 
difference principle in TJ, Rawls in the most recent version of the principles 
of justice places the former as the first subset of the second principle of 
justice, and asserts that it has a priority over the latter. To this principle, I 
now turn my attention.
The Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity
The principle of fair equality of opportunity reads: “Social and 
economic inequalities […] are to be attached to offices and positions open to 
52
all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity[.]”  This principle is 
meant to regulate access to positions and offices established by the basic 
structure and to correct the flaws of formal equality of opportunity in the 
53
system of natural liberty.  
What does the principle of fair equality of opportunity demand, and 
what does it forbid? Rawls maintains that this principle demands more than 
a constitutional essential, and some of its precepts are not counted as 
54
constitutional essentials.  To make his point, Rawls compares fair equality 
of opportunity with formal equality of opportunity, famously known as 
'careers open to talents'. The latter, he says, requires that “all have at least the 
55
same legal rights of access to all advantaged social positions.”  The 
principle of fair equality of opportunity goes beyond this precept. It 
requires “[…] not merely that public offices and social positions be open in 
56
the formal sense, but that all should have a fair chance to attain them.”  In 
order for this precept to work out, it is further required not only that the law 
must not discriminate, but also that it must prohibit discriminatory rules 
57
imposed by other agents.  It is unjust, from the point of view of the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity, if associations affected by this 
principle deny a person access to the position of leadership or to other 




As Pogge points out, just as this principle prohibits positions being 
determined by lot, so does it forbid discrimination by social class, age, and 
economic status in the access to such positions, be it set by law or imposed 
by other agents. Fair equality of opportunity also demands that 
information on the positions of authority be available equally to everyone 
so that none is disadvantaged from lack of information. To be more 
concrete, the principle of fair equality of opportunity mandates that no one 
must be prohibited to compete for educational and employment 
opportunity, that there be no reserve of a certain percentage of management 
position of firms for a certain gender, and no giving of advantage in gaining 
59
admission to universities to a certain race, gender, or economic status.  In 
short, all social impediments, be they due to social class, economic ability or 
cultural barriers, should be cleared away so as to make the equal access 
possible. To achieve all this, says Rawls, political and legal institutions must 
adjust the long trend economic forces in order to prevent excessive 
concentration of property and wealth in a few hands because such 
60
concentration may lead to political domination.
As Rawls maintains, the principle of fair equality of opportunity 
applies first of all to the basic structure of society as a public system of rules. 
It also applies to associations and groups such as firms, labor unions, 
churches, universities and family –in short, all public sectors within a frame 
61
of a nation-state.  It nonetheless applies to these associations and groups 
only indirectly. That is to say, it does not regulate and intervene in the 
internal affairs of those associations. It can intervene only in the case in 
which the acts or conducts of those associations or groups go against the 
constraints it sets in place. For example, the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity does not regulate how churches are to elect their bishops or 
whether or not homosexuals are allowed to be ordained bishops, nor does it 
stipulate whether or not women can be ordained priests in the Catholic 
Church. These matters are, according to Rawls, internal affairs which those 
churches themselves have to decide and regulate through their internal 
62
laws.  Another example: although universities have their own regulations 
on entrance test for prospective students, they cannot discriminate in 
certain ways since such an act denies those discriminated against fair 
equality of opportunity. 
Let us devote some words to highlighting the effects of the priority rules 
on the difference principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity. 
58
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Recall that for Rawls these two subsets of the principles of justice are 
lexically ordered and that the principle of fair equality of opportunity has a 
priority over the difference principle. It demands that, to repeat the point, 
the principle of fair equality of opportunity must be applied and fully 
satisfied first before one applies the difference principle. To illustrate this 
point, consider that it may be possible that the basic structure is designed in 
a way that offices are assigned to superior talents in order to achieve better 
performance in improving everyone's situation. This nonetheless is, 
according to Rawls, a violation of the precept of justice expressed in the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity because those kept out feel treated 
63
unjustly although they benefit from such a design.  Such a scheme, in 
Rawls's view, should not be adopted.
Second Principle of Justice and the Young Rawls's Theological Ethics: 
Exploring the    Connections 
Having been equipped with some essentials of the young Rawls's 
theological ethics and Rawls's second principle of justice, we now consider 
the normative relation between the two. The procedure I will follow in 
taking up such a task is to dig into the basic assumptions of person and 
community upon which Rawls founds his second principle of justice, then 
to place them vis á vis the young Rawls's conception of personality and 
community in order to identify the continuity and discontinuity of ideas 
between them, and finally to explain why the shift from the latter to the 
former has taken place.
Person in the Second Principle of Justice and in the BISF
Behind the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle there lie certain assumptions of person and community. Rawls 
founds his second principle of justice upon an assumption that persons are 
64
free, equal, and rational.  These persons participate in the contract or social 
bargaining in the original position. They are those who engage in the 
process of choosing a conception of justice that would define the terms of 
65
their social cooperation. These persons have two moral powers.  First, they 
have the capacity for a sense of justice; and, second, they have the capacity 
for a conception of the good. Having these two moral powers renders them 
66
apt to be called 'moral persons'.  
In what sense are persons in the context of Rawls's principles of justice 
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said to be free, equal, and rational? Rawls in JFR suggests that persons are 
regarded as equal “in that they are all regarded as having to the essential 
degree the moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation over a 
67
complete life and to take part in society as equal citizens.”  Here equality of 
persons is defined by the holding of moral power to the essential minimum 
degree. In the original position, this equality takes the form of all 
participants (representative persons) being symmetrically situated and 
having equal rights in the bargaining process.
While persons as equal are so defined, Rawls maintains that persons or 
citizens are regarded as free in two senses. First, they are free in the sense that 
they are seen as capable of revising and changing their conceptions of the 
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good on rational and reasonable grounds.  In this regard, they have the 
right to see their persons as independent from any particular 
(comprehensive) conception of the good. Secondly, citizens are said to be 
free persons in the sense that they regard themselves and are regarded by 
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fellow citizens as self-authenticating sources of valid claims.  This amounts 
to saying that they see themselves and their fellow citizens as having space 
within the boundaries set by the political conception of justice to make 
claim on their institutions about their rights and to advance their 
conception of goods.
The third assumption of person that Rawls makes is that persons are 
rational. Persons, as citizens, are regarded as rational in the sense that they 
choose sensible principles of rational choice to guide their decisions in 
social cooperation, examples of which are the adoption of the most effective 
means to achieve ends, the capacity to balance their final ends with different 
– even conflicting – interests and ends of other members, and the capacity to 
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rank priorities.  To the characteristic of persons as being rational, Rawls 
also adds that of being reasonable in the sense that they are willing to accept 
71
the principle of mutuality or reciprocity.
To what extent does this assumption of person resemble the young 
Rawls's conception of person in the BISF? Recall that in the BISF Rawls 
asserts that being in community is the distinctive feature of human being as 
person. Citing Brunner, the young Rawls makes clear what he takes to be the 
truth about person: 
The distinctively human element is not freedom, nor intellectual creative 
power, nor reason. These are rather the conditions of realization of man's 
real human existence, which consists in love. They do not contain their 
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own meaning, but their meaning is love, true community.  
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Obviously, the Rawls of the second principle of justice puts new emphasis 
on the characteristics of a person. Or, rather say, he shifts the emphasis, i.e. 
substituting 'being in the community' as a person's distinctive feature with 
'being free, equal, and rational'; he relegates the former to the background 
and places the latter in the center of the stage. 
Rawls in fact also endorses the notion of equality in the BISF, but here 
too there occurs a shift. The young Rawls draws this notion from the 
interpretation of theological concept of Trinitarian God endorsed by 
Kierkegaard. Paraphrasing Kierkegaard's words he writes: “[…] God is […] 
Three Persons in One, each equal with the other because that perfect 
community is bound by that perfect love and faith, and love seeks equality 
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with the person to whom its givenness is directed.”  By saying that spirit 
(interchangeable with 'person') is communal because s/he is the Imago Dei, 
Rawls seems to be to be implicitly saying that persons are equal too. Here, 
the basis of equality is to be found in God. We will not find such a way of 
explanation in the second principle of justice. In the latter, Rawls founds 
equality on a secular basis, i.e. in “their having equal worth as moral persons 
or their capacity for moral personality” or, more specifically, “having to the 
requisite minimum degree the moral and other capacities that enables us to 
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take part fully in the cooperative life of society.”  Note that here Rawls does 
not explain the metaphysical basis of persons being equal, nor does he use 
the notion of respect or inherent worth of persons. This is because such a 
notion, he maintains, “[…] is not a suitable basis for arriving at these 
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principles [i.e. the principles of justice].”  
Society in the Second Principle of Justice and in the BISF
In working out the principles of justice – the principle of fair equality of 
opportunity and the difference principle included – Rawls makes the 
following fundamental assumption: that society is taken as “a fair system of 
social cooperation [between free and equal rational persons] over time from 
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one generation to the next.”  To the basic structure of society so conceived, 
the principles of justice are to apply to regulate the fair system of social 
cooperation. The type of society that Rawls refers to in the principles of 
justice is the so-called 'well-ordered society', i.e. a society effectively 
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regulated by a public conception of justice.  It falls within the category of 
78
either property-owning democracy or liberal socialist regime.  Rawls does 
not prefer one to the other since both, he says, work things out in the way 




democracy an ample space in his elucidation, Rawls seems to indicate a 
greater favor towards it. 
Another characteristic of society Rawls assumes in the second principle 
of justice is close-knittedness. A close-knitted society is one in which the rise 
or fall of the expectations of one representative individual will affect, 
positively or negatively, the expectations of other representative individuals 
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because members of society are connected to each other like chain links.  
Rawls makes this assumption particularly in his explanation of the 
difference principle. I nevertheless take it, by inferring, to be a characteristic 
of the society.
Placing Rawls's basic assumption of society in the principles of justice 
vis á vis the young Rawls's conception of community, one can hardly avoid 
the impression that both share the same tone. The notion of close-
knittedness of society in the Rawls principles of justice resembles with the 
young Rawls's notion of community as a net of relations, a nexus, in which 
the change of one's relation with a person in a group will change his relation 
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with other members of the group.  
Despite this similarity, it is a mistake to say that community and society 
are for Rawls the same thing. He in fact draws a border between the two by 
placing them in different domains. Society, in Rawls's view, differs from 
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community in several respects.  First, society is bigger than community as it 
consists of communities. Second, only society – through its government 
and law – can exercise coercion while community cannot do so. Third, one 
can leave community voluntarily, whereas there is a sense that one cannot 
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do so with the society which one is in without legal consequences.  Simply 
put, society is for Rawls a democratic state, whereas community is an 
association existing in the state, be it religious, scientific, or professional. 
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Not paying attention to these distinctions, says Rawls, is a serious error.
Major Recurring Themes in Relation with the Second Principle of Justice
The above explication of Rawls's basic assumptions reveals some minor 
continuity and discontinuity in the conception of person and community 
of the young Rawls and the Rawls of the principles of justice. Let us now 
consider some major continuity and breaks taking place in the specific 
context of the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference 
principle as a set, i.e. (1) social contract, (2) utilitarianism, and (3) the quest 
for equality. 
Let us take a look first at social contract. The young Rawls's attitude 
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towards social contract is rather negative. He rejects contract theories 
because, he maintains, they explain the establishment and cooperation in 
community in terms of bargain. For him, doing so is a mistake since 
bargaining stems out from fear, suspicion, and lack of trust and faith in 
God and fellow persons, whereas the foundation of community is in fact 
84
love, faith, and trust.  Thus social contract theories, he asserts, provide a 
false account of community and society: 
[t]he idea of justice expressed in political theories of Hobbes and Locke, 
the view of Adam Smith that we best serve our fellow men by enlightened 
self-interest, all are false views of community. Any society which explains 
itself in terms of mutual egoism is heading for certain destruction. All 
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'contract' theories of society suffer from this fundamental defect.
The Rawls of the principle of justice nevertheless comes to the stage with 
a very different outlook. Discarding altogether his negative attitude towards 
contract theories, he embraces and makes good use of them to construct his 
theory of justice. Reading the preface of the TJa, one can sense that some of 
those whose ideas he was fiercely opposed to in his youth now turn out to be 
86
his closest allies.  This change of attitude is decisive to the principle of fair 
equality and the difference principle since both – as subsets of the principles 
of justice – are constructed basically by assuming that the principles of 
justice are the conception of justice the bargaining parties of the contract 
would choose in the original position to define their fair system of 
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cooperation. They are formed in a hypothetical situation of contract.  
Let us move on to Rawls's attitude towards utilitarianism. Rawls in the 
preface of the TJb states clearly that his conception of justice seeks to 
provide “[…] a reasonably systematic alternative to utilitarianism, which in 
one form or another has long dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of 
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political thought.”  Targeting mainly the classical form of utilitarianism, 
Rawls contends that the defect of the utilitarian conception of justice is that 
it does not take seriously the distinction between persons because it extends 
the use of the principle of choice of one man to social cooperation, and in 
so doing it conflates all persons into one through the imagined acts of the 
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impartial sympathetic spectator.”  
The rejection of utilitarianism is implied in the principle of fair equality 
of opportunity and the difference principle in different ways. With regard 
to the latter principle, Rawls in deciding which scheme of distribution is to 




advantaged better off while giving the highest gain of primary social goods 
to the former. Rawls in this case chooses a strongly egalitarian conception 
in interpreting the difference principle, not following the utilitarian 
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scheme, which notably allows larger inequalities between the two groups.  
With regard to the principle of fair equality of opportunity, Rawls prefers a 
democratic interpretation of this principle, which does not allow the use of 
the scheme utilitarianism may permit for the sake of better performance, i.e. 
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to assign certain powers and benefits to positions.
It should be noted nevertheless that Rawls has already had a negative 
attitude towards utilitarian ideas in his undergraduate thesis. Although he 
does not use the term 'utilitarian(ism)', the ideas that he rejects are ones that 
are at the heart of utilitarianism. He, for instance, refuses to see community 
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as an aggregate of individuals.  He also asserts that the purpose of God's 
creation “[…] is not to save an isolated person here and there, but restore and 
gather together a community of His created ones, which is not merely an 
aggregate, but a community in the full sense bound together by faith and 
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love.”  This is by no means an explicit critique against utilitarianism. 
However, reading this passage while bearing in mind the later Rawls's 
rejection of allocative justice in the TJ, one can hardly avoid inferring that 
the seed of rejection of utilitarianism is already there in the BISF, but it 
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gains full force only in his elucidation of the second principle of justice.
Besides social contract theories and utilitarianism, equality too is a 
theme in the BISF that recurs in the second principle. Just as with the two 
other themes, it cannot be separated from Rawls's conception of person and 
community. In Rawls's view, as we have seen, community is a living together 
of persons bound by love and faith. Just as the Persons in the Trinity are 
equal, so are (human) persons living in community. They are equal by virtue 
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of being the Images of God.  It is in the context of community that Rawls 
elaborates the notion of egoism and egotism. Egotism is an attitude and 
behavior that repudiates community because it refuses to share, seeks to 
develop a closed group, seeks to blame others, and is obsessed with social 
distinctiveness. It is a sin manifesting itself in pride, vainglory, and 
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jealousy.  It can thus be said that egotism is a betrayal of equality in 
community. 
From being a minor theme in the young Rawls's theological ethics, 
equality comes back in the principles of justice and occupies a central place. 
It is this value that the principles of justice seek to safeguard. Although the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle 
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regulate (socioeconomic) inequalities, it is equality that is assumed to be the 
value that both principles try to preserve. So to say, in the second principle 
of justice, equality is expressed negatively and indirectly. Reading Rawls's 
explanation of the second principle in tandem with the notion of egotism 
in the BISF, it is hard to avoid the temptation to see the second principle as a 
direct attack on egotism and to see inequality as a form of injustice as – in 
theological term – a sin. 
In relation with the equality safeguarded by the second principle of 
justice, Rawls also addresses the issue of merit, which he once touched on in 
the BISF. Rawls's rejection of the idea of merit is consistent throughout. 
While in the BISF he rejects it because it assumes a bargain with God in the 
scheme of salvation by doing good in order to win God's mercy, in the 
principles of justice Rawls is against meritocracy because this system leaves 
the less fortunate behind while securing the position of a technocratic elite; 
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and thus there is no equality of opportunity in this system.  Closely related 
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to meritocracy is the notion of desert.  In his elucidation of the difference 
principle, Rawls explicitly denounces desert because it allows individuals 
with greater natural endowment and superior character to have a right that 
enables them to gain benefits without contributing to the advantages of 
others. This notion of deservingness, says Rawls, does not apply to the 
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difference principle since this principle demands mutual benefits.
Making Sense of the Shifts
Some shifts, thus, have taken place with regard to Rawls's conception of 
person and community. How can we make sense of these shifts? 
To answer this question, attention should be paid to one of the 
problems that concerns Rawls in the TJ and even more in the PL, i.e. that of 
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the stability of a well-ordered society.  This stability is crucial because it 
guarantees the persistence of justice. How can a stable well-ordered society 
be achieved? The most reasonable answer, consistent with the way Rawls 
develops his theory of justice, is to make the conception of justice stable 
since it is this conception that defines and regulates the scheme of social 
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cooperation.  
The question is then: How can a stable conception of justice be 
achieved? Rawls fully realizes that society is not monolithic. Its members 
have different, even conflicting, conceptions of justice and worldviews, 
most of which take the form of moral, religious, or philosophical doctrine  
102




Adopting a doctrine of this kind to be a conception that regulates the 
scheme of social cooperation will render that conception of justice unstable 
because there will be lasting disagreements among the members of society. 
To avoid this, the conception of justice to regulate the scheme of social 
cooperation must be, Rawls asserts, one that every member of society can 
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agree upon.  This is the chief reason why in his second principle of justice 
Rawls no longer uses the BISF's theological vocabularies and conception of 
person and community, although the values both endorse are, to my 
reading, the same. Rawls later on in the PL and JFR worked to clarify the 
distinction between a comprehensive doctrine and a political conception of 
justice, the detail of which I unfortunately cannot pursue here.  For the 
purpose of this essay, it suffices to say that the shifts have taken place 
because the conception of justice in the BISF is a comprehensive doctrine, 
and therefore it is unable to guarantee the stability of justice in public life –a 
task which, according to Rawls, only a political conception of justice is able 
to take up.
The reason for the shift to endorsing the contract doctrine is worth close 
attention given that such a shift is a big rupture in Rawls's political thought. 
In the search for the reason for this rupture, the contrast Rawls makes 
between a teleological theory and the contract doctrine may shed some 
light:
[…] the contrast between a teleological theory and the contract doctrine 
may be expressed in the following intuitive way: the former defines the 
good locally, for example, as a more or less homogenous quality of 
attribute experience, and regards it as an extensive magnitude which is to 
be maximized over some totality; whereas the latter moves in the opposite 
fashion by identifying a sequence of increasingly specific structural forms 
of right conduct each set within the preceding one, and in this manner 
working from a general framework for the whole to a sharper and sharper 
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definition of its parts.  
It is probable that the word 'locally' in the passage refers to singularity, be it 
an individual or a case; while by 'general framework' and 'structural forms 
of right conduct' Rawls probably means social institutions. The odds that 
this is probably the case become prime when we read the passage that 
immediately follows, in which Rawls maintains that the example of the 
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theory that defines the good locally is hedonistic utilitarianism.  Thus, the 
reason why Rawls endorses contract doctrine is probably that he wants to 
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focus on the role of social institutions in the realization of social justice.
Concluding Remarks
The requirement of stability and his commitment to the 'political 
conception' renders the result that the Rawls of the second principle has a 
very thin philosophy of person. Some even doubt whether there is a 
106
philosophy of person at all his theory of justice.  This, I believe, is a 
consequence Rawls is fully aware of and the risk he deliberately takes in 
order to be able to fulfill the ambition that his justice-as-fairness carries with 
it. One of the consequences of the suppression of metaphysical claims 
under the political conception is that the route to discover Rawls's 
philosophy of person becomes longer and more complicated since one has 
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to take an indirect approach.   
Although Rawls's emphasis is on the role of social institutions in 
realizing justice, it is nevertheless misleading to say that interpersonal 
relationships are for him insignificant for realizing a just society. He in fact 
acknowledges that a just – or well-ordered – society cannot be realized 
through socio-political institutions alone. The realization of such society, 
he says, depends largely also on the quality of interpersonal relationships 
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among its members, i.e. on affection or fellow feeling in the community.  
This fellow feeling amounts to seeing successes and enjoyments of others as 
complementary to one's own good, reducing egoism and envy to the 
minimum, and not using other persons and associations as merely means to 
achieve one's ends. In order that a well-ordered society can be stable, Rawls 
maintains, this interpersonal relationship is to be turned into the form of 
the so-called 'civic friendship', in which members of the society treat each 
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other as equal and are willing to cooperate for the benefit of all.  
The term 'community' Rawls uses here certainly refers to an association, 
be it religious or professional, within the state. Strikingly, the characteristics 
of relationship in the community of this sense are similar to those of 
community in the BISF despite the fact that Rawls employs a political 
conception in his elaboration of it. I take this similarity to be registering the 
fact that Rawls wants to maintain the values of just interpersonal 
relationship in his political conception of justice while avoiding the risk of 
sliding into a comprehensive doctrine.  Furthermore, his use of some 
elements of his earlier thought opens the possibility of interpreting his 




theory of justice in the light of the BISF is worth taking up indeed. 
Unfortunately, I am not able to pursue it here in detail due to the 
constraints of time and space. I therefore leave it to be a topic for further 
research.  
It is now the time to bring this paper to a conclusion. From the above 
examination of the intersection between the young Rawls's theological 
ethics and the later Rawls's second principle of justice, it can be inferred that 
some themes popping up in the former recur in the latter in one form or 
another. With regard to this recurrence, the following features are worth 
mentioning. First, the core values that Rawls's second principle of justice 
tries to safeguard are those which are highly appreciated in the young 
Rawls's theological ethics, i.e. equality and social cooperation. Second, the 
ways the recurring themes are expressed are different in the BISF and in the 
second principle of justice: theologically-laden in the former, politically-
formulated in the latter. Third, among the recurring themes, some Rawls is 
consistently for (equality, for instance), others he is consistently against 
(utilitarianism, for example), with some others he is inconsistent (for 
example: social contract). It can thus be concluded, as far as the conception 
of person and community is concerned, that the Rawls of justice-as-fairness 
did not discard altogether ideas nor ideals that he once endorsed in his 
undergraduate thesis.
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93
 Rawls, BISF, 247. Italics are added.
94
 In allocative justice, Rawls says, a given collection of goods is divided among definite 
individuals with known desires and needs, in which the allocation of the goods is 
judged in isolation from the system of cooperation because the goods are not the 
products of individuals or of the social cooperation. Allocative justice, Rawls asserts, 
is what the utilitarians hold. Rawls prefers to hold the conception of distributive 
justice, the characteristics of which are exactly opposed to those of allocative justice. 
Rawls discusses this all in his elucidation of the second principle of justice. See Rawls, 
TJb, 76, 77.
95
 Rawls, BISF, 193.
96
 Rawls, BISF, 201, 211.
97
 Rawls, BISF, 91. Meritocracy is a system of government in which an elite is selected on 
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the basis of ability rather than social background –see  Iain McLean & Alistair 
rd
McMillan, eds., Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 3  ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 342. 
98
Desert is a belief that people ought to get what they deserve: benefit is awarded for 
achievement, compensation for injury, wrongdoing for punishment. For a more 
detailed account, see Ted Honderich, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, new ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 206.
99
 Rawls, TJb, 88, 89.
100
 Stability in this context refers to a state in which a just society of free and equal citizens 
profoundly divided by moral, religious and philosophical doctrines endures over 
time. See Rawls, PL, xviii.
101
 Rawls, TJb, 398: “Since a well-ordered society endures over time, its conception of 
justice is presumably stable [.]” I take this passage to imply that the stable conception 
of justice is what makes the society stable.
102
 See, for example, Rawls, PL, 12-13; Rawls, JFR, 60.
103
 See Rawls, TJb, 5. In the PL and JFR, Rawls calls this conception 'a political or public 
conception of justice' and says that the two principles of justice are examples of such a 
conception. 
104
Rawls, TJb, 496. Italics are added.
105
 Rawls, TJb, 496.
106
 This is the critique that Prof. Paul van Tongeren made when this paper was presented 
in the Leuven-Macerata joint seminar at KU Leuven on May 6, 2011.   
107
 Sandel, for example, makes such an attempt by examining Rawls's notion of 'mutual 
disinterest'. For detailed accounts of this illuminating examination, see Michael J. 
nd
Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2  ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 47-65.
108
 Rawls, TJb, 500. 
109
 Rawls, TJb, 470. 
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